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This paper examines some important economic aspects associated with the notion that consistency in the 
regulation of infrastructure businesses is a desirable feature. It makes two important points. First, it is not 
easy to measure consistency. In particular, one cannot simply point to different regulatory parameters as 
evidence of inconsistent regulatory policy. Second, even if one does observe consistency emerging from 
decisions made by different regulators, it does not necessarily mean that this consistency is desirable. It 
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Abstract: This paper examines some important economic aspects associated with the 
notion that consistency in the regulation of infrastructure businesses is a desirable feature. 
It makes two important points. First, it is not easy to measure consistency. In particular, 
one cannot simply point to different regulatory parameters as evidence of inconsistent 
regulatory policy. Second, even if one does observe consistency emerging from decisions 
made by different regulators, it does not necessarily mean that this consistency is 
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  11. Introduction 
 
Consistency is a buzz word in regulatory circles. It has been espoused by many countries 
as one of the key principles of good regulation.
1 Consistency is also routinely demanded 
by regulated businesses.
2 Although there is no universal definition of regulatory 
consistency, the implicit meaning of the term is that one should expect similar regulatory 
decisions when circumstances are similar. This type of consistency, which is the subject 
of this paper, can be viewed as a requirement for equitable treatment; two different firms 
under identical conditions regulated by two different regulators expect to be treated in the 
same way, regardless of their ‘draw’ of regulator.  
 
Examples of where consistency is expected include similar regulatory decisions across 
industries (e.g., gas versus electricity), across state jurisdictions (e.g., gas regulation in 
the Australian state of Victoria versus gas regulation in the state of Queensland), and 
across countries (e.g., competition law across different countries).  The demand for 
consistency is not restricted to the regulation of infrastructure businesses. Consistent 
financial regulation across nations is the main rationale for the Basel II Agreement
3. 
Similarly, a great quantity of resources is devoted to the development of environmental 




Bolt (2004) argues that even when different regulatory models are applied, consistency 
requires that different outcomes should be justified by the circumstances of the industry 
concerned and any remaining differences should not be sufficiently material as to 
introduce perverse incentives for companies or investors.  It is suggested that consistency 
is necessary to avoid regulatory arbitrage. That is, to avoid situations where investment 
decisions and/or management behaviour (or company performance) are driven by 
differences in regulatory approaches.  In addition, regulatory consistency might minimise 
compliance costs of firms that operate across different jurisdictions or industries by 
eliminating duplication of efforts.  
 
There is little doubt that consistent regulation can yield considerable benefits. However, 
consistency cannot be an objective in itself.  There is an obvious point to be made that the 
pursuit of consistency might result in bad regulation that is applied consistently rather 
                                                 
1 See, for example, statements available 
at http://www.dfes.gov.uk/hegateway/uploads/principles_good_regulation.doc 
and http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/proposal/coag-requirements.html. 
2 See, for example, Energy Retailers Association of Australia (2003), Australian Logistics Council (2006), 
and  National Insurance Brokers Association of Australia (2007)  
3 See Bank of International Settlements, 2004.  The Basel II Accord is a recommendation by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision of the introduction of an international standard for banking regulation. 
4 See, for example the Montreal Protocol, available at http://www.unep.org/OZONE/pdfs/Montreal-
Protocol2000.pdf.  The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer is a global 
agreement, involving the phasing out or elimination of the production of various substances, believed to be 
responsible for the depletion of the ozone layer; it has been hailed as one of the most successful examples 
of international cooperation to date. 
  2than inconsistent regulation that is sometimes good and sometimes bad. It follows that the 
quest for consistency needs to be examined in greater detail. In this paper I discuss three 
interrelated facets of regulatory consistency.  
 
First, I explain why it is so difficult to measure regulatory consistency. In particular, I 
summarise recent research findings that show that despite differences in regulatory 
parameters and instruments in Australia, regulatory decisions are surprisingly consistent 
when measured appropriately. Second, I explore some standard mechanisms that might 
result in consistent regulatory decisions. These include legal appeal, centralized decision-
making, and an approach that I describe as pluralistic regulation. Third, I suggest that 
there might be a downside from a regulatory pluralist approach, where different 
regulators from different jurisdictions and/or industries pursue different approaches that 
might result, through a process of learning and selection of good approaches, in 
consistent outcomes in the long-run  
 
Specifically, I observe that consistent regulatory decisions might arise in a pluralistic 
approach, not from sound economic reasons about industry fundamentals, but rather from 
career concerns of regulators. Regulators are faced with the difficult task of making a 
decision under incomplete information about the regulated firm costs. Therefore, having 
observed previous decisions, regulators might be concerned about the effects of a wrong 
decision – and there might be different ways to define what this means – on their own 
career prospects.   
 
2. How to measure consistency of regulation of 
infrastructure businesses?  
 
I argue below that a perfunctory examination of regulatory decisions is likely to reveal a 
large degree of variation across industries and jurisdictions, although the general 
approach might be similar, namely some variation of price cap regulation.  
 
In Australia, for example, there are several state-based regulators who, until recently 
regulated a variety of industries such as water, electricity and gas distribution, ports, and 
rail. There are also federal regulators, including the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission that regulates the post office, telecommunications, and until 
recently electricity and gas transmission. A new federal regulator, the Australian Energy 
Regulator has been established, with responsibility for electricity and gas transmission, 
and in time, electricity and gas distribution, which it will inherit from the various states 
and territories. 
 
Table 1 below reports on the parameters applied by the various regulators to calculate the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC).  Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a wide 
range of parameters across industries and jurisdictions. The true differences, however, are 
more substantial than Table 1 might suggest.  
 
 



























Water NSW  2.30  - 
2.60 
1.15 - 





Qld.  5.45 1.32 6.00  65.00  50.00  2.69  50.00  8.05 
Tas.  3.32 0.70 6.00  77.25  50.00  2.14  50.00  6.37 
Vic.  2.67 1.16 6.00  75.00  60.00  2.55  50.00  5.20 
Electricity 
Distribution 
NSW  3.30 1.00 6.00  110.00  60.00  2.50  50.00  6.70 
Qld.  5.61 1.22 6.00  90.00  60.00  2.76  50.00  8.50 
SA 3.28 1.64 6.00  80.00  60.00  2.44  50.00  6.85 
Tas.  2.90 1.25 6.00  95.00  60.00  2.09  50.00  8.08 
Vic.  2.64 1.43 6.00  100.00  60.00  2.56  50.00  5.90 
NT 5.37 1.20 6.00  89.60  50.00  2.09  50.00  9.67 
Gas 
Distribution 
NSW 2.50  - 
2.80 
1.15 - 





Qld.  5.25 1.43 6.00  110.00  60.00  2.77  50.00  8.75 
SA 2.49 1.25 6.00  90.00  60.00  3.17  47.50  6.14 
Vic.  3.40 1.70 6.00  100.00  60.00  2.20  50.00  6.80 
WA  2.58 1.38 5.50  90.00  60.00  2.51  45.00  6.18 
ACT  2.77 1.34 6.00  99.50  60.00  2.57  40.00  9.62 
Electricity 
Transmission 
Fed. 2.28  - 
5.98 
0.86 - 











































Ports  Qld.  5.84 1.30 6.00  100.00  60.00  2.50  50.00  9.02 
Post  Fed.  5.50 0.30 6.00  74.00  30.00  3.25  50.00  8.70 
Source: This information was collected from the regulators’ websites. The full database with detailed 
information about all regulatory decisions is  available at 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/staff/flavio_menezes/Price_Regulation.html. 
 
There are differences in the treatment of efficiency savings – for example, efficiency 
carryover mechanisms are in use in the state of Victoria but not in other states, the rules 
for resetting the Regulatory Asset Base change across industries and so do the procedures 
for the determination of capital maintenance.  It should be noted that these are very 
similar to the ‘technical inconsistencies’ identified by Bolt (2004), with respect to 
regulation of infrastructure businesses in the UK.  
 
I argue however, that it would be premature to conclude that these wide differences in 
approaches demonstrate a lack of consistency. Instead, the correct method is to determine 
the inconsistencies that remain after controlling for differences in the circumstances 
associated with particular decisions. Breunig, Hornby, Menezes and Stacey (2006) 
attempt to do so. They examined 52 regulatory decisions taken by different Australian 
regulators from 1998 to 2004 across the water, electricity and gas industries.   
 
In particular, they explore the relationship between firms’ revenue requirements and the 
regulator’s allowable revenue determination as a function of variables such as the nature 
  4of the industry, the regulator and the time period. That is, they are mainly interested in 
the difference between Y – defined as a firm’s revenue requirements measured in dollars 
– and MAR  – the maximum allowable revenue. For this purpose, they define the 












where  t  indexes time. Note that in one extreme the regulator can set the maximum 
allowable revenue to exactly cover the firm’s revenue requirement claims making yt = 0. 
At the other extreme, the regulator sets the maximum allowable revenue to zero making yt 
= 1.  The table below is reproduced from Breunig et al.  
 
Table 2: Mean of y by Regulator and Industry 
Industry ACCC  Vic.  NSW Qld.  WA  SA  ACT   
Electricity 
Transmission 
0.195        0.195 
Electricity 
Distribution 
  0.146 0.080 0.017     0.093 0.092 
Gas 
Distribution 
  0.096 0.115 0.088 0.054 0.146 0.137 0.103 
Gas 
Transmission 
0.139     0.448    0.221 
Water    0.041  -0.040     0.022 
  0.175 0.114 0.080 0.041 0.317 0.146 0.115 0.130 
Source: Breunig et al. (2006). 
 
The variable y is an objective measure of consistency and it is of course of relevance to 
regulated businesses. The relevant exercise is then to try to explain y controlling for the 
possibility that the behaviour of firms in gas distribution is different from the behaviour 
of firms in gas transmission, or in electricity, or water. Breunig et al also control for the 
possibility that different regulators behave differently, and allow their behaviour to 
change over time. Having estimated y, they then test whether they can reject the 
hypothesis that regulatory outcomes are consistent across industries and across 
jurisdictions. It turns out that outcomes are surprisingly consistent. 
 
In particular, the authors show that regulatory decisions are reasonably consistent across 
the electricity and gas distribution industries. Moreover, they fail to reject the hypothesis 
that the regulatory outcomes in South Australia, New South Wales, the ACT and Victoria 
are similar. Importantly, more recent research (Breunig and Menezes, 2008) shows that 
this trend towards consistency has intensified over time and extends to other industries.  
 
In summary, this section has reviewed the existing evidence that despite technical 
differences in regulation across industries and jurisdictions, regulatory outcomes may be 
consistent. This raises an important question, namely, what are the mechanism(s) that 
generate such consistent outcomes? This is discussed in the next two sections.  
 
 
  53. How can consistency be achieved? 
 
There are at least three distinct mechanisms that might lead to consistent regulatory 
decisions. First, regulatory consistency can emerge from the appeal process. Regulated 
firms can often challenge regulatory decisions and appeal bodies and tribunals have a 
useful role to play in establishing some general principles. Whether or not this is 
achieved in practice is another issue.
5  
 
Second, regulatory consistency can arise from the merger of existing regulators. This was 
the approach followed in the UK with the establishment of OFGEM and in Australia with 
the establishment of the Australian Energy Regulator. Under this approach, given that 
decisions are made by a single regulator, consistency can be imposed from the top down. 
Of course, this is not to say that consistency will necessarily follow but simply that it is 
easier to implement consistency in decision making if the regulator so desires.  
 
Third, consistency can be achieved by the three-step process described by Muris (2003) 
in the context of global convergence in competition policy. The first step consists of 
decentralized experimentation at the national or regional level. The second step involves 
the identification of superior approaches. The third and final step entails opting-in by 
individual jurisdictions.  
 
I refer to the decentralised experimentation stage of the Muris’ process as the pluralistic 
approach. The basic idea is analogous to the notion of Tiebout competition where 
jurisdictions decide the mix of public goods they offer in order to attract citizens.
6 
Similarly, competition by regulators from different jurisdictions to design good 
regulation in order to attract investment could in principle lead to efficiency and, 
eventually, once the process runs its course, to consistent outcomes.  
 
The idea that regulatory competition can lead to better outcomes than forced 
harmonization has been a subject of intense debate in the context of European 
integration
7, but it also features in many modern federations. For a general comparison 
between regulatory competition and directly coordinated harmonisation, the reader is 
referred to Deakin (2001) and Van den Bergh (1994). My aim here is somewhat different. 
I identify two basic reasons why a pluralistic approach might produce consistent 
decisions, but need not necessarily produce efficient outcomes.  
 
The first difficulty in applying a pluralistic approach is that although regulatory decisions 
are often taken sequentially, there is often not enough time to fully consider the 
consequences of previous decisions. This follows from the nature of most infrastructure 
businesses where investment is lumpy and long-lived, demand is often relatively inelastic 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Bolt (2004) who discusses the role of the UK Office of Fair Trading and Competition 
Commission in inducing common regulatory practices. . 
6 Wooders’ (1980) seminal paper shows how this type of competition can lead to efficiency in a similar 
vein to how competitive markets for private goods, in the absence of market failures, can lead to efficient 
outcomes.  
7 See, for example, Deakin (2001). 
  6in the short to medium term but considerably more elastic in the long-run, and there is a 
high degree of uncertainty (e.g., driven by weather or rain patterns).  
 
Thus, in practice, by the time a regulator from a regional jurisdiction has to make a 
decision, he or she can observe past decisions from other regional or industry regulators 
but not the full consequences of these decisions.
8 This means that a regulator’s ability 
and opportunities to learn from other regulators’ mistakes and correct decisions is 
mited.  
idea is not new and dates back to Stigler (1971), in his model of 
gulatory capture.  
e inability or the high costs for  
onsumers/voters to organise themselves to oppose it.   
 labour). This is accomplished by the 
gulatory pricing structure via cross-subsidies. 
cesses available to regulated firms that are also 
dependent of political influence.  
                                                
li
 
The second difficulty arising from the pluralistic approach where many regulators search 




Stigler argued that politicians might supply regulation in exchange for votes and money. 
In the same vein, firms demand regulation to increase profits. This can be accomplished 
in a number of ways. For example, by imposing taxes on others and using the proceeds to 
provide subsidies to the firms; by raising the cost of entry to other firms; by regulating 
producers of substitute products; and by regulating prices to eliminate price competition 
within an industry. Stigler explained that this process might work because the benefits are 
large and concentrated with a few firms and politicians and the costs are small and widely 
distributed among consumers/voters. Thus, even if the costs of regulation outweigh the 
benefits, regulation might still happen as a result of th
c
 
Posner (1971) extended the capture theory of regulation by arguing that politicians also 
use regulation to gain the support of other groups with influence, namely consumer 
groups and some factors of production (e.g.,
re
 
A major problem with applying the insights from Stigler and Posner – and from more 
recent approaches (e.g., Noll, 1989) – is that an important feature of the modern post-
privatization regulatory environment that is present across countries is the existence of 
independent regulators. That is, a great deal of effort and time is spent in ensuring that the 
legal regulatory framework insulates regulators from the political process. This is 
accomplished by pre-determined terms and making it difficult to remove regulators. 
Often there are also appeal pro
in
 
The key point, however, is that although modern regulators might be more insulated from 
the political process than past regulators, they face other types of incentives. Chiefly 
among these incentives are career concerns. In particular, regulatory decisions might 
 
8 A similar argument can be used to cast doubt on the effectiveness of appeal processes on generating 
consistent high-quality regulatory decisions. Appeals are few and far between and by the time they are 
concluded, their relevance might have been diminished.  
  7influence future job opportunities for regulators, which provide the mechanism for self-
 which can then influence future employment prospects. What is crucial is that 
ere is a feedback mechanism linking regulatory decisions to regulators’ career 
cisions sequentially, under 
complete information about the firms’ true costs and economic environment, and when 
they are concerned about their future career prospects.  
economic 
nvironment. Moreover, regulators often make decisions fully aware of past decisions of 
 on the quality of 
gulatory decisions when regulators make decisions under uncertainty and are concerned 
n independently from a known 
istribution. Importantly, the regulator who moves second can observe the decision and 
en the 
gulator that moves last will act in a socially optimal way. In this case, if identical 
interested behaviour by regulators. 
 
Note that this does not necessarily lead to a sinister interpretation that regulators might 
either try to favour regulated firms or to placate politicians in order to obtain a future job 
with industry or to be reappointed as regulator, respectively. Instead, regulatory decisions 





In the next section I summarise recent research that explores the implications for the 
quality of regulatory decisions when regulators make de
in
 
4. Regulators’ career concerns and bad consistency  
 
The nature of price cap regulation of infrastructure businesses is such that regulators have 
to come to a view regarding the regulated firm’s appropriate revenue requirements for the 
next three to five years. As discussed above, regulators make such decisions under 
incomplete information about firms’ true cost requirements and future 
e
other regulators in different regional jurisdictions or across different industries. 
 
This section reviews some recent research that examines the effects
re
with how these decisions will affect their future career opportunities.  
 
In particular, Menezes and Roessler (2008) examine a situation where two regulators 
make a decision on similar issues in a predetermined order. The decision is summarized 
by the choice of a single parameter. The socially optimal parameter is unobserved but 
both regulators do observe signals that are draw
d
the signal received by the regulator who moves first.  
 
Menezes and Roessler are interested in investigating what happens to the difference 
between the two decisions under different incentive schemes. That is, the authors want to 
investigate whether regulators, when faced with the same information, will arrive at the 
same decision. The benchmark case is that of the "public servant" regulator, who attempts 
to get as close as possible to the socially optimal decision. This is the case wh
re
signals are observed, then identical decisions will be taken.  
 
  8The authors then consider a "copycat" regulator, who is interested in deviating as little as 
possible from the other regulator's decision, and a "yes man" regulator, who wants to 
implement a target decision that is favoured by government or interested lobbies. A 
copycat regulator might emerge when regulators are deemed to have performed well – 
and, therefore, will benefit from a positive career outlook – if there is no arbitrage 
etween different policy regimes, or if there are public charges of unfairness and formal 
ice while the optimal social policy 
ht be setting a high price. That is, under both incentive models, bad consistency might 
a career handicap, or even personal remorse. 
ence regulators balance dual objectives. The objective of minimal deviation in decision 
 match the leader's decision, 
using greater consistency. This is a clear manifestation of bad consistency; identical 
uboptimal decision making that does not make enough use of the 
vailable information and/or is subject to bias. One would like to be able to detect these 
influences empirically, but identification is not straightforward. This is a line of research 
b
appeals on such grounds. Regulators who have arrived at the same decision might not be 
questioned even though that decision might have been the wrong one.  
 
In contrast, a ‘yes man’ regulator might emerge from the standard revolving-door 
motivations, where regulators compete for future jobs at regulated firms by being soft. 
Similarly, a ‘yes man’ regulator might emerge when he or she wants to please politicians 
by taking a particular decision such as setting a low pr
mig
arise as a regulator makes a decision not based on his or her information but rather to 
copy the other regulator or to please an outside party.  
     
The incentives to arrive at the same decisions are mitigated by the threat of a penalty 
when a regulator's decision is too far from the socially optimal policy. This punishment 
may be in the form of a reputation loss, 
H
making is unique to the two incentive models; the other, penalty avoidance, is common to 
all three models including the benchmark. 
 
Menezes and Roessler show that decisions are more consistent under the “copycat” and 
“yes man” incentive mechanisms than under the socially optimal “public servant” 
approach. The intuition is as follows. When regulators try to make socially optimal 
decisions (public servants),  the arrival of new information is likely to change 
the optimal decision, and the follower is expected to deviate a bit from the leader. When 
we add an inherent preference for consistency (copycats) or a specific policy (yes-men), 
the follower has an incentive to ignore new information and
ca
decisions by different regulators arise not because of their information but rather because 
of the incentives they face in terms of their career concerns. 
  
The overall point is that one cannot be unguardedly optimistic about the observed trend 
toward consistency, since it is likely to be influenced by career concerns of regulators. 
Such incentives lead to s
a




  9There are good reasons for requiring regulatory consistency. These include minimising 
cy can be achieved in a number of ways. It can be imposed from the top down 
y the amalgamation of different regulators or by legislative fiat. The difficulty with this 
aking by different regulators across different 
risdictions and/or industries and convergence arises from observation of what works 
 paper we caution against unguarded optimism about the observed trend toward 
onsistency. Recent research reviewed above suggests that such convergence might be 
 
 
ggests a potential paradox. The inherent difficulty 
 judging regulatory outcomes results in placing reliance on proxy measures that look at 
The overall conclusion is that a pursuit of consistency for consistency’s sake should be 
n. Instead, one needs to develop the analytical tools that will allow us 




Common Regulatory Practices.’ Utilities Policy 12, 83-86. 
lia: An 
ory in 
eoul, Korea.  
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and the resulting efficiency losses from distorted 
investment signals, and mitigating compliance costs for companies that operate across 




approach is that it requires a good judgement of what constitutes good regulation. A 
similar concern arises when regulatory consistency is achieved through an appeals 
process.  
 
Consistency can also be achieved by a process of competition amongst regulators. This 
process relies on decentralised decision-m
ju
and what does not work. Above we summarised recent research that suggests that 
consistency might have emerged in the regulation of infrastructure businesses in 




influenced by the career concerns of regulators. This indicates that observed consistency
might not be the result of the best use of the available information and/or is subject to
bias.  
 
The analysis presented in this paper su
in
the characteristics of decision-making, where consistency is one of those proxies. 
However, it is precisely under those circumstances that consistency may not be a good 
thing as it can disguise other factors.  
 
viewed with cautio
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